The big question remains: despite having full intelligence, why were such attacks not prevented?
By Iftikhar Gilani
When former US President Donald Trump survived an assassination attempt on July 13, it recalled a similar incident from January 26, 1995, during India’s Republic Day celebrations.
In Jammu, the winter capital of Jammu and Kashmir, then-Governor Gen. K. V. Krishna Rao had just unfurled the national flag at Maulana Azad Stadium and began his speech. As he declared, “We have broken the backs of…,” a loud bang and a plume of smoke erupted at the stadium gate.
While Rao intended to announce victory over militancy, militants detonated a bomb before he could finish his sentence. Despite the chaos, Rao, a seasoned military man, urged the crowd to remain calm, dismissing the explosion as fireworks.
However, a second explosion soon followed, this time near the podium’s officers’ gallery. Limbs and body parts were flying in the air.
The blast resulted in 18 deaths and numerous injuries.
The National Security Guards quickly whisked Rao away, throwing him into a vehicle and speeding off. Moments later, another explosion occurred beneath the podium, destroying it completely.
The scene at Maulana Azad Stadium descended into utter chaos, with a stampede injuring many children and a disorganized response from security personnel. One senior civil official described the incident as a “total collapse of the security paraphernalia.”
Years later, at a seminar in Delhi, CD Sahay, who was the RAW Commissioner in Jammu and Kashmir at the time of the blast, revealed that security agencies had been aware of the potential for such an attack.
On the evening of January 25, 1995, Rao convened a meeting with key security officials to discuss border development. During this meeting, Sahay, in a reflective mood, had predicted that a bomb would explode at the Republic Day ceremony the following day.
His premonition was based on an accident of chance. Before the meeting, he had consulted his colleagues about discussing anything new with the Governor. They had replied that it was just routine.
It was still time to go for the meeting and there was no work Sahay asked his staff to give him some new files, so he may find something interesting for the Governor.
To his utter surprise, he discovered that out of 13 files, six explicitly mentioned the impending attack on Republic Day in great detail.
Nobody had read or analyzed the intelligence sent by deep-penetration agents.
The files had been consigned to cupboards, with the signatures of Sahay himself.
Suggestions to change the venue were dismissed to protect the source of the intelligence. A search operation that night yielded no results, as the bombs, concealed two feet beneath the parade ground and wrapped in Japanese plastic timers, evaded detection by sniffer dogs.
The remote trigger was later recovered.
Rao’s survival was just due to the handlers pressing the wrong buttons on the remote, resulting in a mistimed explosion. One bomb destroyed the stage, another exploded near the gate, and a third targeted the parking lot.
The 2008 Mumbai attacks also highlighted government failures despite precise intelligence.
Scores of lives lost to terrorists on the fateful night of November 26, 2008, could have been saved in Mumbai had the Taj Palace management agreed to provide food to security guards manning pickets outside the tower lobby.
According to British investigative journalists Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, there were 26 intelligence alerts. The alerts were so precise and specific that Deputy Commissioner of Police Vishwas Nangre Patil conducted a security drill with the staff of the Taj in October 2008. However, the security measures were dismantled as soon as he went on leave, and the security picket near the tower was dismissed in the first week of November. When quizzed, managers of the hotel said, the security guards were asking for food from the hotel kitchen.
The authors claim that the 26/11 attack was distinct in that almost everybody, including the CIA, India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB), Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), and even the Taj management, knew that calamity was coming.
Referring to the forensic account prepared by Black Cat commandos based in Manesar in Haryana, the authors state that they were unofficially mobilized at 10:05 p.m. on November 26, just 22 minutes after the first shots were fired in Mumbai.
But 70 minutes later, they were warned by Cabinet Secretary K. M. Chandrasekhar and later by a Joint Secretary (Internal Security) against mobilization without orders.
At 12:34 a.m., then-Home Secretary Madhukar Gupta gave the go-ahead to NSG Chief Jyoti Dutt after receiving a formal request from Maharashtra Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh.
However, at the Delhi airport, they were informed that the transport plane was 156 miles away in Chandigarh.
NSG head J K Dutt then called RAW to lend an Ilyushin-76 aircraft, but its crew was missing and the plane had not been fueled.
When Dutt called the Home Secretary at 1 a.m., he found that the Home Secretary was stranded in Pakistan and could not get a flight until morning.
Finally, 45 minutes later, when Dutt tried to leave for the airstrip, he was requested to pick up officials from the Home Ministry.
When the plane landed in Mumbai at 5:30 a.m. the next day, there was no transport available except beacon-light-fitted white Ambassadors to take away Home Ministry officials. By the time the NSG took charge, terrorists were in complete control and had effectively dealt a blow to both the Mumbai police and naval commandos.
Similarly, a year-long investigation by Frontline into the Pulwama attack on February 14, 2019—just weeks before the general election—revealed at least 11 intelligence inputs predicting the attack.
The subsequent political and media frenzy, spearheaded by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), emphasized national security and portrayed Prime Minister Narendra Modi as the sole defender of the nation.
Then, the governor of Kashmir, Satyapal Malik, stated that he was instructed to remain silent about any security failures.
The ensuing media coverage, including exaggerated claims of Pakistani casualties from the Balakot air raid, contributed significantly to Modi’s electoral triumph in 2019.
The big question remains: despite having full intelligence, why were such attacks not prevented? Is there an underlying agenda to allow these attacks to portray Pakistan negatively on the global stage? There are no clear answers.
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