During her first term, Benazir was keen to improve relations with India, but during her second term, she surprisingly cold-shouldered New Delhi
Ahead of the SAARC summit in Pakistan held on 29–31 December 1988 in Islamabad, then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi sent his diplomatic adviser, Ronen Sen, to prepare for the visit and to meet the newly elected Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto – the first female head of government in any Muslim country.
Sen’s one-on-one meeting with Pakistan’s democratically elected prime minister in Karachi was progressing as expected until they touched upon a sensitive issue.
Benazir looked at Sen conspiratorially and raised her finger to her lips. She scribbled something on a slip of paper and passed it to Sen, indicating that the room might be bugged.
Both of them communicated through exchanging slips of paper for the next half hour, without speaking a word.
It was an unusual meeting, conducted in silence but filled with exchanged notes.
India’s last High Commissioner to Pakistan, Ajay Bisaria, documents this and other incidents in his 558-page book, Anger Management: The Troubled Diplomatic Relationship Between India and Pakistan.
During her first term (December 1988 – August 1990), Benazir was keen to improve relations with India. The two countries nearly reached an agreement to settle the Siachen Glacier issue.
However, in her second term (October 1993 – November 1996), her attitude changed significantly. She did not grant an audience to Satinder Lambah, who had taken over as Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad in 1992, and she refused to attend the SAARC summit in New Delhi, instead sending President Farooq Leghari in 1995.
In a December 1988 meeting, Sen conveyed India’s concerns about Pakistan’s accelerated nuclear programme.
Benazir replied that she was out of the loop regarding the army’s activities on the nuclear front. She did, however, agree that an agreement on the non-attack of nuclear installations would be beneficial.
Benazir noted that dealing with India through SAARC would be easier for her than doing so bilaterally. Sen assured her that India would let her decide on the pace and scope of progress in the bilateral relationship and that she should only do what she felt comfortable with.
According to the book, as the meeting ended, Benazir requested that Sen not record or circulate her remarks, which were intended only for Rajiv Gandhi.
The incident reflected both the paranoia of Pakistan’s first woman prime minister’s civilian regime and the delicate relationship with India.
Benazir reciprocated Rajiv’s gesture of sending a special envoy by designating her foreign affairs adviser, Iqbal Akhund, and a Pakistani Parsi confidant, Happy Minwalla, as her ‘points of contact’ between Rajiv’s office and hers.
She clearly did not trust her own foreign minister, Yaqub Khan, who she had retained on the advice of Pakistan’s president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan.
Ronen Sen also visited Islamabad in the summer as Rajiv’s special envoy to follow up on the prime minister’s December 1988 visit and to prepare for the next bilateral meeting. Sen was granted an exclusive meeting with Benazir at her official residence in Islamabad. J.N. Dixit, who had taken over as High Commissioner in 1989, accompanied him.
In an aside to the two Indian diplomats, Benazir confided that she continued to face strong resistance from President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and army chief Aslam Beg on both India and Afghanistan policies.
Nuclear Tests and Israeli Plan
During her second term, Benazir remained suspicious of Indian High Commissioner Satinder Kumar Lambah, who had now taken over as High Commissioner in 1992.
Lambah had served in Islamabad as deputy high commissioner in the early 1980s, during which he befriended a young steel tycoon in Lahore named Nawaz Sharif.
Lambah had maintained this connection and even hosted Sharif in Delhi for a Chinese meal at the House of Ming, where a waiter spilt soup on Sharif’s white suit. Benazir viewed him as Sharif’s ally rather than an Indian envoy, to the extent that Lambah once requested Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to transfer him from Pakistan.
Bisaria, who has also served as Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s private secretary, writes that the Pokhran nuclear tests were originally planned for April 1998. However, India’s president, K.R. Narayanan, was travelling to Latin America at the time.
Soon after being sworn in as prime minister in his thirteen-day government in 1996, Vajpayee met with the outgoing prime minister, Narasimha Rao, and scientists Abdul Kalam and R. Chidambaram to ensure the smooth takeover of the nuclear programme.
Rao explained the circumstances, including US pressure, that had forced him to delay the tests. In fact, Rao had agreed to the tests in 1995, but American satellites had detected the activities around Pokhran, leading the US ambassador to confront Rao with the evidence.
On 11 May, Vajpayee waited tensely in a control room at his residence, No. 5 Race Course Road, which had been equipped with a direct communication hotline to the test site in Pokhran. He was joined that afternoon by his colleagues in the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) – L.K. Advani, George Fernandes, Jaswant Singh, and Yashwant Sinha.
The team included Principal Secretary Brajesh Mishra, Cabinet Secretary Prabhat Kumar, Foreign Secretary Krishnan Raghunath, and Vajpayee’s private secretary, Shakti Sinha.
At exactly 3:45 p.m., the scientists in Pokhran saw a blinding flash of light on their monitors, confirming that three devices had successfully detonated in underground shafts. A few minutes later, Abdul Kalam called the PMO control room. Brajesh Mishra answered the call to hear an excited Kalam say, “Sir, we have done it.” Mishra responded, “God bless you,” and announced the success to the room.
In Islamabad, Indian High Commissioner Satish Chandra received an unusual message around midnight on 27 May to visit the Foreign Office.
Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad informed him that Pakistan had credible information that India was planning to attack Pakistan’s nuclear facilities using F-16 aircraft stationed at Chennai airfield.
When Chandra pointed out that India did not possess F-16 aircraft, Ahmad suggested they could be Israeli. When Chandra inquired if Ahmad was referring to any of the nuclear installations listed by Pakistan at the beginning of each year, Ahmad mumbled a response about ‘other’ facilities.
It was an indication that the bombers were supposed to target the Chagai nuclear testing site in Baluchistan, just the day before Pakistan conducted its own nuclear tests.
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